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Reducing Litigation Costs in the NHS: A Comprehensive Proposal for
Implementing a Compensation Cap in the United Kingdom's Taxpayer-
Funded Healthcare System

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The National Health Service (NHS), established in 1948, is a publicly funded healthcare system in the United Kingdom that provides comprehensive healthcare services to its citizens. In recent years, the NHS has faced increasing financial pressure due to rising litigation costs. These costs not only divert resources away from direct patient care but also have a direct impact on taxpayers, who must bear the financial burden of settlements and court fees.

This whitepaper proposes a comprehensive framework for implementing a cap on compensation payouts in the NHS, with the aim of reducing the burden of litigation costs on taxpayers and ensuring the long-term sustainability of the system. The proposed framework includes:

1. A multi-stage compensation model that takes into account the severity of the injury, age of the person, lifestyle changes, future medical care, and lost income;
2. A new law for the House of Commons that outlines the compensation cap and provides clear definitions for minor errors that are not eligible for litigation;
3. An analysis of three hypothetical medical malpractice cases to demonstrate the impact of the proposed compensation cap on payouts;
4. An international comparison of litigation costs.

By adopting this framework, the government can protect taxpayers from excessive financial obligations arising from medical malpractice claims while ensuring that the NHS remains a viable and effective healthcare system.

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26th April, 2023



II. INTRODUCTION:

The NHS, as a cornerstone of the United Kingdom's healthcare system, relies on taxpayer contributions to provide comprehensive healthcare services to its citizens. The rising costs of litigation have put a strain on the NHS budget, diverting resources away from direct patient care and leading to concerns about the sustainability of the system. In contrast, private healthcare systems operate on a for-profit basis, with patients or their insurers bearing the costs of treatment. While litigation costs also impact private healthcare systems, these costs are typically passed on to patients and insurers in the form of higher fees and premiums.

III. The Need for a Cap on Litigation Costs in the NHS:

In a healthcare system funded by the taxpayer, it is essential to strike a balance between the rights of patients to seek compensation for negligent care and the need to preserve public resources for the provision of healthcare services. High litigation costs in the NHS have a direct impact on taxpayers, who must shoulder the financial burden of settlements and court fees. By implementing a cap on compensation payouts, the government can:

1. Protect taxpayers from excessive financial obligations arising from medical malpractice claims;
2. Ensure the long-term sustainability of the NHS by reducing the burden of litigation costs on its budget;
3. Encourage a more efficient allocation of public resources, enabling the NHS to focus on improving patient care, rather than diverting funds to cover litigation expenses;
4. Promote fairness and equity in the compensation process by creating a more predictable and uniform framework for determining payouts;
5. Discourage frivolous lawsuits and reduce the backlog of cases in the legal system, allowing for swifter resolution of legitimate claims.

IV. Breakdown of Litigation Costs and Legal Fees:



Between 2011 and 2020, the annual cost of clinical negligence claims ranged from £1.19 billion to £2.36 billion, while legal fees associated with these claims ranged from £199 million to £520 million (1, 2, 6, 9). It is important to note that these figures only represent clinical negligence claims and do not include other types of litigation, such as employment disputes or property-related claims (10, 11).

The average payout per case during this period varied but generally increased over time. However, the median payout remained relatively stable, indicating that a small number of high-value cases might have driven the increasing average payout (12).

According to the NHS Resolution Annual Reports, legal costs have been a significant component of the overall cost of clinical negligence claims. Legal fees include both claimant and defendant (NHS) legal costs. Here's an overview of the annual legal costs for clinical negligence claims from the financial years listed:

- 2012-2013: £199 million
- 2013-2014: £259 million
- 2014-2015: £292 million
- 2015-2016: £418 million
- 2016-2017: £498 million
- 2017-2018: £520 million
- 2018-2019: £442 million
- 2019-2020: £426 million
- 2020-2021: £471 million
- 2021-2022: £426 million

Annual costs from the National Health Service Litigation Authority (NHSLA) Annual Reports:



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2012-2013: £1.28 billion

2013-2014: £1.19 billion

2014-2015: £1.35 billion

2015-2016: £1.49 billion

2016-2017: £1.71 billion

2017-2018: £2.23 billion

2018-2019: £2.36 billion

2019-2020: £2.32 billion

2020-2021: £2.21 billion

2021-2022: £2.40 billion

IV. Proposed Multi-Stage Compensation Model:

The proposed multi-stage compensation model includes the following components:

1. Determine Economic Damages (E_D) as the sum of:

- a. Past Medical Expenses (PME)
- b. Future Medical Expenses (FME)
- c. Past Lost Income (PLI)
- d. 75% of Future Lost Income ($0.75 * FLI$)

Determine Non-Economic Damages (NE_D) by considering:

- a. Severity of injury (S)
- b. Age of the person at the time of injury (A)
- c. Lifestyle changes required due to injury (L)
- d. Pain and suffering (P_S)

Apply a cap of £150,000 on Non-Economic Damages (NE_D).

Apply Adjustment Factors:



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a. Contributory Negligence (CN)

b. Mitigating Factors (MF)

Final Payout (P) = (E_D + NE_D) * (1 - Adjustment Factors)

2. Apply caps for specific case types:

- a. If the case is a wrongful death case, cap the total recoverable damages, including both economic and non-economic damages, at approximately £1.5 million.
- b. If the case is a birth injury case, cap the total recoverable damages, including both economic and non-economic damages, at £1 million.

3. Limit non-economic damages (N_D) to £150,000.

4. Calculate the total compensation (TC) as the sum of economic damages (E_D) and non-economic damages (N_D), subject to the applicable caps.

V. Proposed Law for the House of Commons:

The proposed law for the House of Commons includes the following sections:

Section 1: Introduction and Purpose

Section 2: Definitions (including a clear definition of minor errors not eligible for litigation)

Section 3: Implementation of the Multi-Stage Compensation Model

Section 4: Caps on Compensation for Specific Case Types

Section 5: Limit on Non-Economic Damages

Section 6: Exclusion of Minor Errors from Litigation

Section 7: Effective Date and Application

VI. Three Hypothetical Medical Malpractice Cases:

The following are examples of three hypothetical medical malpractice cases to demonstrate the impact of the proposed compensation cap on



payouts. The formulas used to calculate the compensation amounts are based on the multi-stage compensation model outlined in Section IV.

1. Case 1: A 30-year-old patient suffered a severe spinal injury due to surgical negligence, resulting in permanent paralysis.

- a. Economic Damages (E_D) = PME + FME + PLI + (0.75 * FLI)

- b. Non-Economic Damages (N_D) = £150,000 (capped)

- c. Total Compensation (TC) = E_D + N_D

- d. Before the cap: Total Compensation (TC) = £3,000,000

- e. After the cap: Total Compensation (TC) = £1,530,000

Expanded with weighting:

Economic Damages:

Past Medical Expenses (PME): £15,000

Future Medical Expenses (FME): £100,000

Past Lost Income (PLI): £5,000

Future Lost Income (FLI): £800,000

$$E_D = £920,000$$

Non-Economic Damages:

Severity (S): 9

Age (A): 30

Lifestyle Changes (L): 8

Pain and Suffering (P_S): 7

$$NE_D = \min(£150,000, (0.35 * 9) + (0.05 * 30) + (0.15 * 8) + (0.25 * 7))$$

$$NE_D = £150,000 \text{ (capped)}$$

Adjustment Factors:



Contributory Negligence (CN): 0.1

Mitigating Factors (MF): 0.05

$$P = (920,000 + 150,000) * (1 - (0.25 * 0.1)) * (1 - (0.15 * 0.05)) = \\ \pounds 1,010,875$$

2. Case 2: A child sustained a birth injury due to negligent prenatal care, leading to cognitive and physical disabilities.

- a. Economic Damages (E_D) = PME + FME + PLI + (0.75 * FLI)
- b. Non-Economic Damages (N_D) =

£150,000 (capped)
- c. Total Compensation (TC) = E_D + N_D
- d. Before the cap: Total Compensation (TC) =

£2,500,000
- e. After the cap: Total Compensation (TC) =

£1,000,000

(capped per Colorado regulations)

3. Case 3: A 45-year-old patient suffered complications from a misdiagnosis, leading to a prolonged recovery and temporary loss of income.

- a. Economic Damages (E_D) = PME + FME + PLI + (0.75 * FLI)
- b. Non-Economic Damages (N_D) =

£150,000 (capped)
- c. Total Compensation (TC) = E_D + N_D
- d. Before the cap: Total Compensation (TC) =

£500,000
- e. After the cap: Total Compensation (TC) =

£330,000

VII. International Comparison of Litigation Costs:

In order to better understand the need for a cap on compensation payouts in the NHS, it is essential to compare the litigation costs in other countries with different healthcare systems. This comparison can offer valuable insights into how different systems cope with litigation costs and can help guide the implementation of a suitable compensation cap in the NHS.

1. United States:



The United States operates a predominantly private healthcare system, where medical malpractice litigation is common. The cost of malpractice claims in the U.S. is quite high, with the average payout in 2019 being around \$348,065. The U.S. has implemented caps on compensation in some states, with varying limits on economic and non-economic damages. For example, Texas caps the total recoverable damages in wrongful death cases at approximately \$1.9 million, while Colorado caps the total recoverable damages in birth injury cases at \$1 million.

2. Canada:

Canada has a universal healthcare system similar to the NHS but also allows for private healthcare services. Medical malpractice litigation costs are significantly lower in Canada than in the U.S. The average payout in Canada in 2019 was approximately CAD \$221,892. Some Canadian provinces have implemented caps on non-economic damages, with the limits ranging from CAD \$300,000 to CAD \$393,000, depending on the province.

3. Australia:

Australia has a mixed healthcare system, with both public and private healthcare services. Medical malpractice litigation costs in Australia are lower than those in the U.S. but higher than in Canada. In 2019, the average payout in Australia was approximately AUD \$369,000. Australia has implemented caps on non-economic damages, with limits varying by state and ranging from AUD \$250,000 to AUD \$600,000.

4. European Countries:

European countries, including Germany, France, and Sweden, have different healthcare systems, but most of them are based on universal coverage. Medical malpractice litigation costs in these countries are generally lower than those in the U.S. and Canada, with average payouts ranging from €50,000 to €300,000. Some European countries



have implemented caps on non-economic damages, while others rely on guidelines and expert panels to determine compensation amounts.

VIII. Conclusion:

The proposed cap on compensation in the NHS, as detailed in this whitepaper, represents a necessary step towards addressing the financial strain of litigation on the taxpayer-funded healthcare system. Certainly, we are required to recognise that all litigation costs are a large and significant burden on the tax-payer, and as a consequence detrimental for the provision of care for the public at large. By implementing this cap, the government can protect taxpayers from bearing the excessive costs associated with medical litigation while ensuring that the NHS remains sustainable and can continue to provide high-quality care to its patients. The new multi-stage compensation model, combined with the proposed law for the House of Commons, offers a fair and equitable approach to determining compensation payouts while discouraging frivolous lawsuits and reducing the legal backlog. In light of the international comparison of litigation costs, it is clear that such a cap is a prudent measure in line with practices in other countries, but more specifically for the intent and purpose of the NHS.

In conclusion, the adoption of the proposed framework for implementing a compensation cap in the NHS is essential for protecting taxpayers from excessive financial obligations and ensuring long-term sustainability. This approach aligns with the measures taken by other countries to control litigation costs and maintain the viability of their healthcare systems. By taking decisive action now, the government can secure the future of the NHS for generations to come.



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